I. Scenarios
The impact of Brexit depends on the terms of the withdrawal agreement under Art. 50 TEU. It is rather likely that this will not remain the only treaty to be agreed upon between the UK and the EU but that one or several others will be necessary to determine their future relationship. 2 There are of course myriad ways in which the relations between both partners could potentially be structured, depending on the outcome of the negotiations. Three basic scenarios stand out, however.
A. Accession to the European Economic Area
A first possibility is that the UK joins the likes of Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland to become a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). 3 The EEA, which was established in 1994, is not a customs union, so the UK would be free to negotiate its own trade deals with other countries and thus fulfil one of the objectives pursued by the Leave campaign. At the same time, the four fundamental freedoms (freedom of goods, of services, of persons and of capital) would continue to apply to the UK. 4 This solution would guarantee British companies and undertakings unfettered access to the Internal Market. The UK would however be bound by all acts of the EU that are mentioned in the Agreement or referred to by the EEA Joint Committee. 5 It would therefore have to transpose all directives and apply all regulations of the EU in the field of business and finance without being able to influence their content because of its absence at the negotiating table in Brussels. Such 'diplomacy by fax' will be difficult to sell to the British public as an improvement over the current situation. An even more bitter pill to swallow is that workers would enjoy the same freedom of movement as they do today. This is hardly the result that those in favour of leaving the EU have had in mind.
The UK could however join the EEA under special conditions, and try to obtain what is sometimes called an 'EEA minus' state. In particular, it could strive to bargain business and solicit in the territory of the other contracting state. 10 CETA furthermore provides a 'prudential carve-out' for all regulatory measures. 11 If this model were to be followed, UK financial services firms serving EU customers would need to fully comply with EU rules. In turn, they would need to set up EU branches is if they were entirely unrelated to the EU.
C. Third Country-Status
As a third option, it is also possible that the UK and the EU will not, or at least not immediately coinciding with Brexit, reach any agreement on their future commercial relations. The UK would then have the same status as any third country in relation to the EU, and so would the EU Member States in relation to the UK. Imports and exports would fall under WTO law, namely GATT and GATS. 12 The principles of most favoured nation and of national treatment would secure a minimum of free trade in goods.
Technical barriers, such as differences in product regulation, would however remain.
This would force firms to comply with dual standards and lead to additional paperwork, e.g. for certifying compatibility with security requirements in the export destination.
Even more important are obstacles to the provision of services. The GATS accords market access and national treatment only where the contracting states have undertaken specific commitments. 13 Specific GATS commitments do not exist between the UK and the EU Member States.
They were thought to be unnecessary at the time of the conclusion of GATS because the UK was a Member of the then EC. These commitments would thus have to be first negotiated before British firms can offer their services to clients on the continent, and vice versa. Even then, British firms would be subject to EU rules on third countries which could, for some regulated sectors, amount to the requirement to fully comply with EU law. 10 Art. 13.7(6) ibid. The weakness of the obligations of the Parties is compounded by the fact that they retain the right to define the notion 'doing business' and 'solicitation', see ibid. 11 Art. 13 .16 ibid. 12 Both the EU and the UK have signed the WTO Agreements in Marrakesh in 1994. The UK will therefore continue to be bound by the revised GATT and the GATS. Some authors argue, though, that a renegotiation of the UK's membership is needed as it will not be able to fulfil the obligations undertaken by the EU on its behalf, see Markus W Gehring, 'EU Law Analysis: Brexit and EU-UK Trade Relations with Third States' <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/03/brexit-and-eu-uk-traderelations-with.html> accessed 12 August 2016. 13 Art XVI and XVII GATS.
D. A Bespoke Relation
It is unlikely that the future relations between the EU and the UK will simply be a copycat of an arrangement between the EU and another state. The British Prime Minister Theresa May has made it known that she is aiming for a solution that departs from existing models. 14 It is not unlikely that the importance of maintaining mutually beneficial trading relations will inspire both partners to forge a tailor-made compromise. However, any outcome will still fall under one of the three main scenarios: it can either be accession to the EEA, i.e. a multilateral solution, a bilateral agreement, or no deal at all.
Game theory is useful to throw light on the path that the negotiations can take. 15 At first blush, the situation seems to resemble that of a typical prisoner's dilemma, in which both sides are better off if they cooperate. However, the payoffs for the EU are greatly reduced because any attractive bargain for the UK may encourage other Member States to head for the exit door as well. The EU has thus less reasons to be forthcoming to the UK than a player in a typical prisoner's dilemma. Moreover, the EU can hardly be stylized as a single player because it is driven by the -very diversepreferences of the 27 remaining Member States. As these preferences and those of the UK are constantly changing with the evolving political situation, one can imagine that the separation agreement will not be the final say but rather the start of new and repeated attempts at modelling their relationship.
There is not much sense in trying to gaze into a crystal ball. The only certainty for now is that it is impossible to predict the exact outcome of the negotiation process.
In the following, the consequences of Brexit must therefore be evaluated against the backdrop of the current legal situation. Along the way, possibilities for special 14 The Prime Minister said: 'We need to find a solution that addresses the concerns of the British people about free movement, while getting the best possible deal on trade in goods and services. We should be driven by what is in the best interests of the UK and what is going to work for the European Union, not by the models that already exist.', see 'PM and Slovakian Prime Minister Fico Statements in Bratislava: 28 July 2016 -Speeches -GOV.UK' <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pmstatement-after-meeting-slovakian-prime-minister-fico-in-bratislava-28-july-2016> accessed 12 August 2016. 15 Game theory has already been used to study the interaction between the EU and the UK before the referendum, see arrangements that deviate from existing models will be discussed. The analysis will therefore yield not so much a prediction of what is to be expected than an outline of what needs to be done and agreed on specially. We will first look at the consequences for contractual relations (II), then at non-contractual relationships, in particular at torts (III). After that, we will deal with company law -including insolvency law -(IV), financial law (V), and finally with dispute resolution (VI).
II. Brexit's Impact on Contract Law
The loss of the UK's status as an EU Member State could impact on existing contracts between private actors, both juridical or natural persons, on two different levels: It could either change the selection of the applicable law, or have consequence on the level of substantive contract law.
A. Consequences for Conflict of Laws
Legal certainty in contractual relations would be seriously affected if the legal system that applies to private agreements would change as a result of Brexit. On both sides of the Channel, courts so far determine the law applicable to contracts via the rules of the Rome I Regulation. 16 After the UK has quit the Union, this regulation will cease to apply in British courts. The Rome I Regulation has however a forerunner with a very similar content, i.e. the Rome Convention. 17 The question arises as to whether this convention will revive and be of continued relevance post Brexit. Two problems have to be distinguished in this regard. However, any lacuna in the Rome Convention has to be filled by applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which governs the interpretation of all international agreements. As a consequence of circumstances that were not foreseen at the time of conclusion of the treaty, the Vienna Convention only provides States with the right to terminate a treaty or to withdraw from it, not for an automatic end. 20 Moreover, this right exist only where "the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty". 21 Arguably, the remaining Member States and the UK may still perform the obligations under the Rome Convention after Britain's departure from the EU, namely to apply the law designated by the Convention's rules.
The second question is whether the Rome Convention is still in force or whether it has been terminated as a result of the adoption of the Rome I Regulation. the Regulation "replaces" the Rome Convention. 22 The same provision adds that the Convention continues to apply to those territories of Member States which fall within its territorial scope but are not covered by the Regulation. Those are mainly British, Dutch and French overseas territories that are not part of the EU. 23 It has been argued that the reference to "Member States" in Article 24 Rome I would exclude the continued application of the Convention to non-Member States. 24 Yet the provision as such is incapable to change the scope of an act under public international law to which non-Member States are a party. Article 24 Rome I also does not mention Denmark, which refused to take part in EU judicial cooperation and therefore continues to be bound by the Rome Convention. 25 All that Article 24 Rome I shows is that the Convention is not completely discarded, but continues to exist.
The better view is therefore that the Rome Convention still exists and will again be applicable to the relation between the UK and other signatory States once Brexit becomes a reality. 26 The only Member State not bound by the Rome Convention is Croatia, which became an EU Member only in 2013, five years after the adoption of the Rome I Regulation. This does not matter, however, as the Convention establishes uniform rules -a 'loi uniforme' -of conflict of laws 27 which continue to bind the UK.
There will thus be no going back to the previously governing English rules of conflict of laws, which were not substantially different from the rules of the 1980 Rome Convention. 28 Legal certainty with regard to the law applicable to contracts will therefore in general be maintained. There are however slight divergences between the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation. For example, the Rome Convention does not contain any of the Rome I rules about insurance contracts. 29 Both texts also diverge regarding the treatment of foreign overriding mandatory rules. 30 But there are also details to consider. One of these details pertains to Article 6(4) lit. d Rome I, which makes sure that all contractual 31 relationships stemming from the issuance of, or public bids of, securities as well as collective investment schemes are governed by the same law (typically the law of the issuer, or fund manager, respectively), regardless of whether investors are consumers pursuant to Article 6(1) Rome I or not. In a similar vein, Article 6(4) lit. e Rome I subjects all contracts concluded within multilateral trading systems to the laws of one jurisdiction. These rules were added to the rules of the Rome Convention in order to ensure the uniformity of the legal regime applying to instruments such as shares or bonds, to takeover bids and to transactions on exchanges. 32 The UK is well advised to remedy any divergence with Rome I by a provision in the withdrawal agreement or by a separate treaty clarifying that British courts will continue to apply the Rome I Regulation. Since both sides benefitted from the harmonization of conflicts rules, we do not deem the area politically sensitive; such an agreement is thus likely. It would, however, create problems with regard to the ECJ's jurisdiction (see infra part III).
B. Consequences for Substantive Contract Law
The implications of Brexit may also be felt when it comes to the rights and obligations arising out of private agreements. The fact that the UK is no longer an EU Member State may be a sufficient ground to terminate a contract. The precise consequences depend, of course, on the applicable rules. 29 See Art 7 Rome I Regulation. According to Article 1(3) Rome Convention, most insurance contracts fall outside of the Convention's scope. 30 See Art 9(3) Rome I Regulation versus Art 7(2) Rome Convention. 31 Some of the financial relationships may be governed by company, or trust law, respectively to which Rome I does not apply, cf. Art 1(2) lit. f, h Rome I. 32 Under English law, both parties can be wholly discharged of their contractual obligations under the doctrine of frustration. 33 Its conditions are however conceived very narrowly: It applies only where a supervening event either renders the performance of an obligation impossible or deprives it of all interest to both parties. 34 Such situations will arise rarely. A hypothetical example involves an English law firm that advises a client regarding EU subsidies for an investment in the UK. As these subsidies will no longer be available after Brexit, the service promised will become pointless. But importantly, the doctrine of frustration does not apply where the performance of a contract has merely become more difficult or expensive. Thus, a contract is for example not frustrated by the fact that a UK bank has lost its EU passport and can only perform its obligation via a subsidiary or branch that it must first establish within the EU. Many long-term agreements under English law contain hardship or force majeure clauses. 35 They could cover Brexit, but this depends on their precise wording. in the contract. 38 While France has implemented a right to renegotiate or even dissolve of contracts under a hardship doctrine very recently, 39 it is noteworthy that this doctrine applies to contracts only concluded at or after 1 October 2016. At this point in time, however, the Brexit is no longer 'unforeseeable', thus it does not prompt the right to renegotiate or terminate the contract. Brexit may however incentivize courts in EU/EEA countries to develop a hardship doctrine outside of their civil codes and apply it retroactively to contracts entered into before the referendum of 23 June 2016. In doing so, these courts may be looking at the examples of Germany, Spain or other countries that have adopted the doctrine without a clear legislative basis.
Whether Brexit amounts to a fundamental change of circumstances that significantly alters the balance in the performance of contractual duties very much hinges on the specifics of the contract. In the aforementioned example of a bank losing its passport, the performance of the contract will become excessively onerous where the bank has only one client in the respective Member State, but arguably not so where the bank has contracted with a large number of clients who it could serve by means of establishing a new subsidiary or branch under the EU's third country rules.
With regard to employment contracts, the UK's exit from the EU may constitute a sufficient ground for terminating obligations. This will be true where the task fulfilled by the employee is no longer required. A case in point is the employment relationship with janitors or cleaning personnel for European Union bodies and agencies in London, such as the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA) or the European Investment Bank (EIB). The essential staff of these agencies will continue to be employed but forced to move to a remaining Member State. For other cases, the legal situation is not so clear. A British airline that has lost the licence to perform intra-EU flights might for instance dismiss flight personnel, but only where their services cannot be used on other routes. Everything depends on the applicable law and the individual circumstances. The only certainty is that a certain nationality, whether British or that of a remaining Member State, should as such not be a ground for dismissal. 38 To sum up, Brexit's consequences on the contract's substantive regime depends on (a) the applicable legal regime and (b) the factual question as to which extent it renders the performance of the contractual obligations impossible or more onerous.
Equally important will be the influence of Brexit on the development of contract law doctrine in the EU. English law was of particular importance for the nascent discipline of European private law, which is mostly conceived as a mixture of EU rules and comparative Member State law. 40 English law has often served as a counter model to the more homogenous rules of countries following the continental tradition.
It has thereby served as a gateway for the introduction of common law inspired solutions into the process of European legal harmonisation. 41 With Ireland as the only remaining pure common law country in the EU, and Malta as a mixed sytems, this influence will now be greatly diminished. One may hope -or fret -that EU law will become more continental, and British law will return to its old roots. A new divide of private law may open up across the Channel.
III. Brexit's Impact on the Law Applicable to Torts and Other Non-Contractual Obligations
So far, British courts have had to determine the law governing non-contractual obligations in accordance with the Rome II Regulation. 42 The category 'noncontractual obligations' encompasses e.g. unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio, and pre-contractual liability (culpa in contrahendo). 43 The Rome II Regulation provides dedicated conflict rules for each of those institutions. Because of the Regulation's principle of universal application, 44 courts in the remaining Member States will continue to heed these rules in cases related to the UK even after its withdrawal from The Rome II Regulation will however no longer be binding on UK courts. There is also no forerunner that could take its place. A draft convention that would have contained conflict rules for non-contractual obligations has never been adopted. 45 The UK is therefore free to fall back to its previous private international law, which was guided in principle by the application of lex loci delicti. 46 In case of conduct and damage occurring in different countries, it gave prominence to the place of damage. 47 This is similar to the Rome II Regulation. 48 However, the UK's autonomous private international law misses clear-cut rules on applicable law issues such as product liability, competition law, or intellectual property law, not to speak of unjust enrichment and pre-contractual liability, which are all covered by EU conflicts law. 49 One way for the UK legislator to fill this void is to copy and paste the Rome II Regulation into its domestic law. Whether Parliament will take this step is an open question. Another possibility is a treaty between the EU and the UK which replicates the provisions of the Rome II Regulation. But even if either of those routes were taken, it is doubtful whether European conflict of laws would function as smoothly as before Brexit. One aspect that drives the Rome Regulation's efficiency is their interpretation by the ECJ, which is binding all Member States' courts. It is unlikely that the ECJ's jurisdiction will readily be accepted by the UK, given that the Court of Justice was a main target of criticism by the Leave supporters. Interestingly, the dependency on "foreign judges" was also one of the arguments that fed the Swiss people's resistance against the EU in 1992. 50 In order to keep Swiss law close to EU law, the Swiss legislator embraced the concept of "autonomous implementation", which considers ECJ judgments and other EU sources as relevant for construing Swiss legal rules that have been voluntarily taken over from European law. 51 Another example is provided by the relationship of the ECJ and the EFTA court. While both are tied together by the mutual goal to develop and clarify the same European legislation, British courts' aligning interpretation of its own law would be a single-sided effort given that the ECJ is not bound, nor need to look at, the British courts at all. Eventually, the model of Liechtenstein law could lead the way toward the right balance between autonomy and convergence. The Principality has a long tradition of importing legal transplants from Austria, Switzerland, Germany and -with regard to Liechtenstein trust law, one of its unique features as a civil law jurisdiction -the UK.
Its courts consider judicial decisions from the transplant's country of origin to have an indicative albeit not binding effect for the interpretation of the same provision in Liechtenstein law. 52 This way, the small Principality not only taps the rich case law provided by other states and fills a void left by the small number of cases handled by its courts. It also guarantees legal certainty and harmony with the EU's legal system.
The UK could achieve the same objective through deeming the ECJ case law as precedents for purposes of the construction of its private international law. This would (1) enhance legal certainty, (2) keep the close relationship between (future autonomous) British and European conflicts of law intact, and (3) and achieve the benefits of a harmonious determination of the applicable law, such as the exclusion of incentives for forum shopping. Whether these benefits are sufficiently important for the UK to accept some influence of the ECJ on the interpretation of its law is another matter.
IV. Brexit's Impact on Company (Including Insolvency) Law

A. Consequences for Companies Incorporated under English Law
Brexit may also spell trouble for corporations organized under English law and registered at the Companies House in Cardiff. 53 The reason is that many continental laws treat EU and third-country corporations differently. Under the EU's fundamental This result can best be achieved by applying the so-called 'incorporation theory', which holds that a company is governed by the law of the State in which it is registered or organized (which normally amounts to the same). 55 With regard to companies organized under a third-country law, however, many Member States still follow the socalled 'real seat theory', according to which the law of the State where the company's head office is applies. 56 The difference does not matter as long as a company is registered in the country of its head office and organized according to this country's corporate law.
Companies incorporated and headquartered in England will thus continue to be recognized in EU Member States as English law companies even after Brexit. The situation will however be much more complex for those companies organized under English law that have their head offices on the continent. 57 After the UK's departure 54 (table) . The from the Union, they will no longer benefit from the freedom of establishment under the TFEU. If the real seat theory is applied to them, they will be governed by the law of the State of their head office, e.g. by Austrian, Belgian, French or German law.
The consequences could be disastrous. According to the most radical version of the real seat doctrine, a company that is not organized under the governing law will be considered non-existent. 58 As a result, assets and liabilities of English law companies on the continent will have no owners and become bona vacantia. 59 A softer variant of the real seat theory suggests that the company continues to exist in the corporate form provided by the domestic law of the State where it has its seat. 60 61 While the company would not lose its legal personality, the changes to its legal regime would be far from benign. The company's shareholders could no longer invoke the limitation of their liability which was a given as long as they were governed by English law. 62 Acts taken by the management could be invalidated as the rules on the company's representation under English and German law are different. 63 attractiveness of the English corporate form for German founders results mainly from the very low minimum capital requirements, the rapid incorporation procedure and the absence of co-determination, see Ringe, id. 238. The inverse situation, i.e. the incorporation of a company under German law with headquarters in the UK, is not known to the authors, although German law expressly allows it, see sec 4a German Act on private limited companies (GmbHG). 58 This version has been prevalent in Germany for a long time, see German Federal Court, BGHZ 53, 181. 59 Whether these assets fall to the English Crown is another problem, which is not yet resolved. 60 This version has been adopted more recently by German courts, see BGHZ 151, 204. 61 See sec 705 et seq. German Civil Code (BGB). The German corporate form corresponding to a plc would be a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). However, incorporation as a GmbH is conditioned on certain steps, inter alia a registration, which the plc's founders have not undertaken. Brexit. 66 Such a solution would not solve the cost problem and also engender considerable uncertainty if the grace period is not respected.
Third, the theory of 'vested rights' could be extended to the conflict of legal regimes in time. 67 Vested rights theory is intimately related to conflict of laws and protects reasonable individual expectations as to the applicability of a certain law. 68 The adoption of this doctrine to solve intertemporal conflicts does not necessarily require legislative intervention. Courts could emphasize that the founders of an English law company used the law of what was then a EU then Member State, and that they trusted in the continued application of English law. They could deem this trust to be legitimate and worthy of protection, as private persons cannot foresee such a groundbreaking change in the political landscape and should not suffer the risks resulting from it. We note that national company laws provide for doctrines with an outcome similar to vested rights which could also be utilized. 69 In contrast to the first and second path of action, the vested rights doctrine would allow companies in the EU to continue to operate under English law. Some Member States might find this unacceptable. They could be especially worried that English law is applied dynamically, i.e. including amendments post-Brexit, thus giving the British lawmaker a continued influence on the corporate governance of EU companies. A solution to this problem could be to freeze the applicable English law at a certain moment in time, e.g. at the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU. But this would create a new set of problems: it would decouple the companies from sensible evolutions of English law, create a parallel petrified regime and probably spur considerable confusion as well as legal uncertainty. specifying the date of reincorporation which may be hard to determine with the EU-UK negotiations pending), it seems preferable since automatic reorganization would reduce costs and enhance certainty. Moreover, it would also benefit the legal industry in the Member State in question by extending the scope of national corporate law.
B. Consequences for British SEs
There are a few companies with head offices in the UK that are incorporated as a Societas Europaea (SE). 70 This corporate form will no longer be available in the post Brexit era because the SE Regulation not only requires that the company is set up in the territory of the Union, 71 but also that its registered office and its head office are both located there. 72 In order to maintain their legal form, British SEs must thus transfer their seat to one of the remaining Member States. This can be done by creating a new legal person without the need of any winding-up. 73 Alternatively, British SEs may choose to rescind their status by reincorporating as companies under English, Scottish or Northern Irish law. The British lawmaker ought to take steps to facilitate a change to one of the latter laws if it wants to keep them on its territory.
C. Consequences for Insolvency Proceedings
In the years preceding the Brexit referendum, UK courts, lawyers and insolvency administrators have developed a profitable business model by restructuring companies from other EU Member States. Especially popular was the 'scheme of arrangement', which is not a proper insolvency proceeding, but a voluntary agreement between the company's creditors. 74 In case of acceptance by a majority of 75% of the creditors, it binds all of them regardless of whether they have approved it. 75 The scheme of arrangement offered an attractive way to impose a haircut on recalcitrant creditors the company. The restructuring of companies from other Member States in the UK was made easier by Britain's wide interpretation of rules of jurisdiction. Thus, it was considered that companies could have their centre of main interest (COMI) in England even if they had moved there very recently. 76 This opened the way to conduct insolvency proceedings of continental companies under UK law. The scheme of arrangement is applied not only to companies organized under English law, but also to foreign companies provided they have a 'sufficiently close connection' to the UK, that there is a reasonable possibility of benefit accruing to creditors from the scheme, and that one or more persons interested in the distribution of assets are persons over whom the English court could exercise jurisdiction (so-called 'core requirements'). 77 English courts consider these three core requirements as discretionary and not as limiting their jurisdiction, which provides them with additional leeway. 78 As a surplus, they construct the three criteria in a very wide manner. In particular, they consider there to be a 'sufficiently close connection' to the UK if the agreement which is the subject of the scheme is submitted to English law and to the jurisdiction of UK courts. 79 On top of this, they consider the selection of English forum and ius to be sufficient even where it is made ex post by a supermajority of the creditors. 80 They thereby allow free choice of the scheme for all practical purposes.
The expansive view of British insolvency jurisdiction and scheme applicability has led to the emergence of a great deal of 'insolvency and restructuring tourism' to the UK. Until now, other Member States were required to recognize British insolvency measures and decisions under the European Insolvency Regulation. 81 With regard to schemes of arrangement, there was a certain tendency to consider them as falling under the Brussels I Regulation, with the effect that they would have to be recognized as well. 82 Brexit will fundamentally change this situation. The European Insolvency Regulation will cease to apply to British insolvency measures and judgments originating in the UK. They will instead be governed by the differing rules of the Member States for third-country insolvencies. 83 The latter often contain special hurdles for recognition. This may include, e.g., the control of the foreign insolvency court's jurisdiction and the compatibility of its decision with domestic public policy. 84 Though the Brussels Convention will continue to apply, 85 continental courts might show less willingness to apply its rules to recognize and enforce British schemes of arrangements. Moreover, since the freedom of establishment will be abandoned in relation to the UK, it will no longer be possible to move companies to the UK with the goal of winding them up there. 'Insolvency and restructuring tourism' to Britain will therefore come to an end. As of now, European passports are reserved to firms located in Member States.
V. Financial Law
A. Passporting Concept
Unless the UK seeks the status as a member of the European Economic Area (see SUPRA, I.A.), they will not be available for UK firms. Even the status of an EEA country would not necessarily result in full market access. It has to be borne in mind that the EEA countries were prevented from entering crucial parts of the EU financial market after the adoption of three omnibus directives creating the European Supervisory Authorities ESMA, EBA and EIOPA. For instance, the implementation of the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) into the EEA acquis took more than three years. 86 After all political questions had been solved, the technical implementation started, which has as of now required another two years. At the time this article is written, i.e. more than five years after the AIFMD's entry into force, the EEA countries still lack market access for AIFs. Under the current terms, market access may be denied in case of any change of EU law until the EEA agreement is adapted. This means that the EU sets the terms and EEA-only Member States must follow suit. The UK would be ill-advised to bet on the administrative efficiency and willingness of European institutions in the absence of institutional reforms of the EEA agreement. Such an institutional reform could take one of two ways. First, market access could be allowed to all EEA-only Member States that accept the EU rules before the EEA agreement is amended. Second, the order could be reversed: market access is to be granted under the old terms unless the new terms have been transposed into the EEA agreement or a certain grace period -e.g. of up to five years -is expired.
B. Country-by-country Access
Most financial relationships with third countries, in particular all services targeted at retail clients and retail investors, are governed by national law. For instance, the Directive on Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS Directive) provides that Member States regulate their relationship vis-à-vis third country firms independently. 87 For that purpose, the Directive imposes a nondiscrimination rule (i.e. firms from third countries must not be treated more leniently than those from Member States) as well as the right of third country entities to enter the European market by establishing subsidiaries that will be subject to all provisions of European law. 88 Similarly, the Directive on Managers of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFMD) allows for a country-by-country authorization scheme for third country managers of alternative investment funds. 89 These National Private Placement Regimes (NPPR) continue to be available in some Member States after the entry into force of the AIFMD. 90 However, the EU Commission must decide by 22 January 2019 whether to phase them out. 91 As long as these regimes are available, British firms may only rely on some Member States' NPPRs. Furthermore, many Member States have added national provisions to the minimum requirements set by the AIFMD. 92 Reliance on NPPRs will thus open some markets for British firms, but comes at heavy costs because they will need to meet many different national requirements.
In order to achieve further legal certainty, some third countries have entered into bilateral agreements that grant their firms access to the Single Market, but require the same for firms from EU Member States. For instance, Swiss fund management companies received the right to distribute UCITS-equivalent investment funds to German retail investors, while German UCITS management companies were granted the right to enter the Swiss market. 93 A bilateral strategy could open certain key parts of the EU market to British financial services firms, in particular access to retail investors. This will however require painstaking negotiations and a clear determination which national interests should prevail, given that only few key priorities can be pushed through. Similar to the situation with Switzerland, we assume the result of bilateral agreements to look rather patchy, and thus costly to manage for financial firms. We do not expect large scale access to retail clients and retail investors to be granted by the EU to British firms.
C. Third Country Passports and Equivalence
When financial services are distributed to professional investors, the more modern European financial law directives and regulations adopt a supra-territorial approach. 94 For instance, the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) and the AIFMD state allow third country firms to obtain a passport which permits them to provide financial services to professional investors and manage alternative investment funds that can be distributed to professional investors in all Member States. 95 While the EU has some experience with giving access to third country securities offerings under the Prospectus Directive, 96 granting passports to intermediaries and thus all of their products is a relatively novel evolution. The European legislator has foreseen safeguards to protect European investors and the financial system alike: For instance, the AIFMD makes the passport for third country firms subject to a lengthy approval procedure that incluces ESMA, the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament as well as the competent national authorities. 97 The outcome of this process is uncertain. Market access may or may not be available for third country fund managers, or made subject to certain conditions. In addition, the introduction of the AIFMD's third country platform has been suffering from considerable delay. As of now it is uncertain whether it will be available before the AIFMD's first review which is going to start in 2017. 98 agreement has been implemented by virtue of an implementing ordinance ("Ausführungsverordnung"). The Third Country Passports grant the right to provide services to professional investors to non-Member States firms if the regulation as well as the supervision of the third country meets the equivalence test. 99 The core elements of this test are the duality of equivalent substantive law and equivalent enforcement by the third country authorities. 100 In particular, the financial intermediary must be subject to (1) legally binding rules which are equivalent to those set out in European law, (2) authorisation or registration requirements and (3) effective supervision and enforcement on an ongoing basis. In addition, cooperation agreements must ensure that Member States' authorities can rely on the information gathered by the supervisory authority in the third country. 101 The agreements are negotiated centrally on behalf of all Member
States by the European Commission and the ESAs. This means that British supervisory authorities will have to enter into cooperation agreements with European institutions before the UK regime can be considered equivalent with that of the EU.
In practice, the equivalence requirement has not proved to be a major barrier for important financial centres. For instance, ESMA has recently deemed the US regulation on private investment funds as being equivalent to the AIFMD despite the fact that US depositaries neither are obliged to control the fund manager nor are strictly liable for the safe keeping of the fund's assets. It also did not bother ESMA that US law neither restricts the AIFM personal's remuneration nor imposes a leverage control similar to EU law. If this lenient strategy is continued, we expect British law and practice to be deemed equivalent, as long as it does not change radically after Brexit.
D. Some Surprising Additional Requirements
If the UK were to become a third country and try to access the Single Market via the equivalence test, it would nevertheless have to accept some unexpected disadvantages. These have been created by EU financial law. by the parties. As a result, English and New York law -so far, the only legal systems that can be chosen under the ISDA Master Agreement -will be superseded by MiFID II and MiFIR in court litigation. An arbitral tribunal sitting in the EU is likely to adopt the same interpretation. Although arbitral tribunals are technically not bound by legislation of the country where they reside, their award could be set aside by its forum's courts, e.g. on the basis of a violation of the forum's public policy. We hold that at least certain mandatory requirements of MiFID II and MiFIR are part of (European) public policy. 106 Once an award that disregards these rules has been set aside by a European court, other countries may refuse its recognition and enforcement. 107 Intermediaries must consider this far-reaching effect of EU law prior to offering the service to clients located in Member States.
E. Incorporation vs. Branches
In response to the foreseeable passporting issues, one option that some British financial firms may consider is to incorporate within the EU/EEA, while retaining significant activities in the UK. This approach seems feasible only to a certain extent. 
F. Loss of Representation of British Interests
A certain degree of ambiguity has always been a characteristic feature of European financial law. This ambiguity is due to the pressure to find a compromise position among many different governmentss and authorities. While a mere nuisance in the past, it threatens to become risk for future EU-UK relations.
To illustrate, the Solvency II governing insurance undertakings provides two concepts for determining the location of business -the location of risk or the location of client approach. 109 While the concepts come to the same result in most cases, the outcome differs where a corporate client insures risks located in a (Member or third country) State different from his place of incorporation. Interestingly, almost all continental jurisdictions have adopted the location of risk approach, with the UK being the eminent example of the location of client approach. When both concepts collide, as of now, the authorities discuss which authority is in charge. If they continue to disagree, EIOPA is to moderate the discussion, and, if disagreement persist, address an individual, binding decision to the intermediary in question. 110 We find a similar ambiguity with regard to the limits of what constitutes an alternative investment fund. The British Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is willing to consider pre-existing groups other than family offices -for instance friends that frequently make investments together -to fall outside of the AIFMD's scope, while most continental authorities deem these groups to be within the scope, and thus subject to the AIFMD's licensing requirement. 111 We find similar ambiguity in other important parts of European financial law, despite the EU's commitment to develop a Single Rule Book.
In the past, this ambiguity provided room for regulatory arbitrage within European financial law. In particular, it allowed certain unlicensed third country vehicles to be established and to operate from the UK. In the future, the British authorities are likely to be prevented from protecting their national interests in the ESMA, EIOPA, EBA and ESRB working groups. With the British authorities being limited to a mere visitor status similar to that of the Swiss FINMA or Swiss Central Bank, we also expect a number of less ambiguous and more rigid decisions by the European Supervisory Authorities. This may prove harmful for British interests since correcting the position will require bilateral negotiations against the joint position of all national and EU supervisory authorities. Only EEA membership would avoid this degradation of British authorities.
VI. International Litigation
The Brussels Ia Regulation contains a highly effective mechanism for cross-border territories. The better arguments therefore speak in favour of a continued existence of the Brussels Convention and its reapplication after the UK's exit from the EU. 115 Yet the applicability of the Brussels Convention far from removes all grounds for worries. Three important problems remain. The first is that the geographical scope of the Brussels Convention only partly covers that of the Brussels I Regulation. Due to the fact that 13 Member States -mainly Eastern and Southern European countries -acceded to the EU only after the Convention had been transformed into a Regulation, they had never been bound by the former. 116 The courts of these states will therefore not be obliged to suspend proceedings in favour of British courts first seized or recognize and enforce judgments rendered in the UK. The second point is that the Convention's regime differs in more than one respect from that of the Regulation. For instance, it does not contain the single head of jurisdiction for contractual disputes regarding contracts for sale of goods and services. 117 Recognition and enforcement of judgments under the Convention's regime is still predicated on a special declaration by the host state that the foreign judgment has legal force within its territory -the exequatur -, a requirement which has been abolished by the Brussels Ia Regulation. 118 Another example of a deviation is a new provision in the Regulation seeking to exclude dilatory litigation tactics (the so-called "Italian torpedo") in case the parties have entered into a choice-of-forum agreement. 119 Practically this means that it will be difficult to enforce British judgments in Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, and vice versa.
In sum, the UK's withdrawal from the EU will make cross-border litigation in Europe more difficult. Action in this area is therefore urgently needed. The Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention have been very successful instruments in the past, a fact that is widely recognized even in Britain. At the same time, judicial cooperation in civil matters is in both the EU's and the UK's interest independently of the shape of their future economic relationship. It is therefore likely that they will reach an agreement on this topic. As a model for implementation, one could look to the treaty concluded between the then European Community (EC) and Denmark in 2005, which extends the scope of the Brussels I Regulation to their relations. 124 The UK could also become a party to the Lugano Convention 2007, which is not only open to EFTA, but also to other States, provided that all signatories agree. 125 It is hard to imagine that the EU would deny such consent, given its interest in judicial cooperation with the UK.
VII. Conclusion
The future coherence of EU -UK commercial relations depends on three aspects: a) the status of the UK, b) the level of autonomy which the UK government and its people wants to exercise once it can deviate from EU law, and c) the outcome of bilateral negotiations which will start once the British government has issued the notice foreseen in Article 50 TEU.
The three factors are correlated with each other, although not to the same extent: 1) While a pure third country status would seemingly provide full autonomy, it would come at the greatest costs for the British economy in terms of Single Market access. The UK could try to balance them by trade agreements with countries outside the EU, exercising the 'autonomy' large parts of its population are craving for. This will howver require lengthy negotiations, which can only start once Brexit is completed and the power to shape its own trading relations is reverted back to the UK. In the meantime, a pure GATT and GATS regime will apply. The Most-Favoured Nation Clause in these agreements will prevent the UK from discriminating between EU and non-EU firms. It will be effectively forced to extend any advantage it offers to third countries to European firms without receiving any consideration in return. It thus faces the unattractive choice of either having to impose high tariffs on all imported products further for UK firms, they will eventually take into account that the EU is a much bigger market and therefore a more attractive trade partner than the UK. The perspective that the EU can be rationally expected to demand the same or even better treatment than the UK from its trading partners clouds the prospects for successful British negotiations with third coutries. 126 Even worse, the pure third country status opens a Pandora's box full of potential issues of conflict with the EU on the UK's future trade partners. The EU bodies would be ill-advised to lend a hand to the UK's ambitions of prospering outside of the Single Market.
2) An EEA status would secure market access for British firms, but reduce the UK's autonomy, probably behind the level is currently experience as important EU member. Moreover, under the current design of the EEA the UK would be exposed to the risk of political influence on EU level which may result in a less-than-expected market access.
3) Bilateral agreements have serious disadvantages. They are costly to negotiate, and even more costly to maintain. Their outcome will remain uncertain and unstable for years. On the upside, bilateral agreements may result in a greater degree of British freedom to negotiate market access with other third countries than an EEA membership. However, any advantage granted to third countries will result in either granting the same benefit to EU firms, or impair the UK's equivalence status.
The dream of 'a Delaware at Europe's border' is therefore unmasked as an unrealistic option. The more prudent voices in the British government want to curb migration and maintain Single Market access. This could be achieved, e.g., by a reform of the EEA. One should however not expect the EUto sell its key asset -market access -at low costs given that such a move would inspire other Member States to follow. Furthermore, a reform of the EEA would take years and would be difficult to 126 This may explain the cold shoulder British PM Theresa May experience in Beijing and in the U.S.. Cf. The Guardian, Theresa May joins G20 summit to face Brexit warnings from US and Japan, 4 September 2016 ("Obama tells prime minister US won't prioritise UK trade deal while Tokyo warns of consequences for Japanese businesses" "After her first bilateral meeting with Obama, May was warned that the US wanted to focus on trade negotiations with the EU and a bloc of pacific nations before considering a deal with the UK.").
